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The Meaning of “Other-Power” 
in the Buddhist Way of Salvation
Takeuchi Yoshinori
The Notion of Other-Power
In what follows I should like to offer a brief description of what I call 
Buddhist existentialism, which I take to be closely related in turn to the 
question of “Other-Power” (Jap., tariki).* 1 In India's Religion of Grace and 
Christianity, Rudolf Otto cites a simple but really perfect image for Other- 
Power in religions of grace by contrasting the way of the cat with the way 
of the ape. When danger threatens a cat with her young, she takes her 
kitten in her teeth by the scruff of its neck and leaps to safety. The young 
one does nothing for its salvation: it remains completely passive. In 
contrast, when the mother ape leaps to safety, its young grabs ahold and 
clings to her, and in this way cooperates in its own salvation: it is a syner­
gist.2 The comparison is graphic and at first blush causes no particular 
difficulty.
♦ The essay printed here was originally delivered in German to a gathering of emi­
nent Buddhist and Christian scholars at the Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule 
St. Gabriel in Modling, Austria, between 10 and 13 June 1981, and later printed in Er- 
Idsung in Christentum und Buddhismus, ed. by A. Bsteh, Modling, 1982, pp. 175-93.
1 Tariki signifies an exclusive trust in the “Other,” that is, in the gracious 
power of Amida Buddha. The Shin and Jddo sects of Japanese Buddhism hold to this 
view. In general, the standpoint of jiriki g shows an opposite tendency to that of 
tariki, stressing religious self-liberation. The principal representative of this view of 
“self-deliverance” in Buddhism is Zen.
2 Rudolf Otto, India's Religion of Grace and Christianity Compared and Contrasted, 
trans, by F. H. Foster, London, S.C.M. Press, 1930, p. 56.
But from what standpoint, we might ask, is Otto looking at the two 
ways to compare them? Is his a standpoint ab extra? Or is it ab intra, 
that is to say, one that looks at a way without leaving the way itself?
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If he is standing outside of the way, then his observations may be scien­
tifically accurate, but for that very reason lack existential awakening: 
the power to open the way to the observer is lacking. Is he already on 
the way? Then why does he turn his gaze to the other way? Or does he 
perhaps find himself standing at a fork in the road, undecided? Or again, 
maybe he has reached the end, where all the great paths converge? Ques­
tions such as these become significant when we have to do with the prob­
lem of whether salvation can be achieved by oneself alone, or whether 
the final, authentic ground of deliverance and salvation lies in Other- 
Power. For the purposes of this paper, I would approach this problem 
from a Buddhist frame, restricting myself mainly to considerations of the 
essence of primitive Buddhism.
To begin with, something further needs to be said in the way of clarify­
ing the notion of “Other-Power.” According to Otto, the essence of 
religion relates to our experience of the numinous, to the feeling of the 
“Wholly Other.” This numinous contains within itself a polarity: the 
mysterium tremendum and the mysterium fascinans. In Christianity the 
feeling of being a creature and the sense of the majesty of God belong to 
the order of the mysterium tremendum., and the experience of God’s freely 
bestowed grace, to that of the mysterium fascinans. With a view to the 
history of religions, Otto speaks in this regard of the experience of the 
sublime (majestas) and of grace.
In the history of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese Buddhism, the notion 
of Other-Power came increasingly to be vested with the popular spirit. 
Belief in Amida Buddha (Amitabha, Amitayus), together with its dogma­
tics and philosophy, resulted from the efforts of masters and disciples of 
the Mahayana schools attuning themselves to the voices of the masses 
and striving thereby to tap the underground waters of religious life.
As for the polarization of religious sentiment in the Buddhist world, 
it is clear to believers that the idea of Other-Power means the freely be­
stowed grace of Amida Buddha which possesses limitless power in the form 
of a Vow (the aspect of the fascinans). The tremendum^ meantime, is inter­
nalized in the form of a fundamental self-consciousness of one’s own 
death and one’s own sins, a consciousness that is infinitely deepened and 
widened by sarpsara and karma.
How do the ocean of light of Other-Power and the dark seas of sarjisdra 
and karma relate to one another ? The light is the light that proceeds from 
eternity to eternity, over which darkness has no proper claim. Even if 
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darkness has ruled for thousands of years in some hidden cave, the 
moment light shines in it is dispelled! From the very start, darkness is 
but a nihility* .  Buddhist metaphysics has dealt with this problem in a great 
many ways down through the years. In the famous introduction to Bud­
dhism known as The Awakening of Faith3 we are told: The law of Buddha 
is real truth. It is our self at its depth. It is authenticity itself, the An-und- 
fiir-sich. But then, how does the phenomenal world (the world of appear­
ances) come about? Whence the turbidness of the human spirit? It is like 
the relation between sea and wind. The sea of itself is calm, but is whipped 
up into waves by the wind.
3 D. T. Suzuki, Aivaghosa's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mah&yana, 
San Francisco, 1980, pp. 36-37.
* The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Ahguttara-Nikdya), Vol. I, trans, by F. L. 
Woodward, London, Pali Text Society, 1979, pp. 128-29 (III, 4, 38).
But this leads us to ask further: Whence comes the wind? In the end 
we come to two abysses locked in combat with one another—and I, the 
sounding board set between them. Were we to ask Otto for his view on the 
matter we would receive the simple but profound reply, “Both belong to 
a feeling of the numinous.” But we still want to know how the two come 
together in this feeling. “That,” he would probably say, “is the mysteriwn”
In Japanese Buddhism, we may note in passing, the classic advocate of 
the doctrine of Other-Power was Shinran (1173-1262), while Dogen (1200- 
1253) upheld the contrasting view of salvation through oneself. Although 
these views are radically opposed to one another, the personality, con­
viction, and thought of Shinran and Dogen are closely akin at the core.
The Young Buddha and His Way Inward
The story of how the Buddha as a young man came to set out on the 
holy quest is recorded in one of the suttas of the Ahguttara-Nikaya, and 
may be broken up into three texts:4
Text 1 Monks, I was delicately nurtured, exceedingly delicately nur­
tured, exceedingly delicately nurtured, delicately nurtured be­
yond measure. For instance, in my father’s house lotus-pools 
were made thus: one of blue lotuses, one of red, another of 
white lotuses, just for my benefit.... By night and day a 
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white canopy was held over me, lest cold or heat, dust or chaff 
or dew, should touch me. Moreover, monks, I had three 
palaces: one for winter, one for summer, and one for the 
rainy season. In the four months of the rains I was waited on by 
minstrels, women all of them ...
In this midst of this “delicate nurturing,” the sutta goes on, the young 
Buddha was driven to reflection:
Text 2 To me, monks, thus blest with much prosperity,... this 
thought occurred: Surely one of the uneducated manyfolk, 
though himself subject to [the law of] old age and decay, not 
having passed beyond old age and decay, when he sees another 
broken down with age, is troubled, ashamed, disgusted, 
forgetful that he himself is such a one. Now I too am subject 
to [the law of] old age and decay, not having passed beyond old 
age and decay. Were I to see another broken down with old 
age, I might be troubled, ashamed, and disgusted. That would 
not be seemly in me. Thus, monks, as I considered the matter, 
all pride [mada] in my youth deserted me.
Again, monks, I thought: One of the uneducated manyfolk, 
though himself subject to [the law of] disease, not having 
passed beyond disease, when he sees another person diseased, 
is troubled, ashamed, and disgusted, forgetful that he himself 
is such a one...
And so there follows a series of questions similiar to those that had been 
raised with regard to old age and youth, this time on disease and health, 
and than on death and life, the result of which is that all pride in health 
and life deserts the young Buddha.
The linking together of the description of the superfluity of pleasures 
in the three palaces on the one hand with the Buddha’s self-reflections 
on old age, sickness, and death in the midst of such magnificence on the 
other, seems to have come from the hand of the redactor of the AAguttara- 
Nikaya who carried over the number “three” in order to link the texts 
together. If we set these two texts alongside the Chinese translation, we 
discover that they had originally been independent of one another. The 
second text is then followed by a passage on “The Threefold Pride,” 
which ends with the metrical hymn:
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Text 3 Though subject to disease and eld and death, 
The manyfolk loathes others who are thus. 
Were I to loathe the beings who are thus 
‘Twould be unseemly, living as I do.
So living, knowing freedom from rebirth [dhamma],
1 conquered pride of youth and health and life.
For in release [upddhi] I saw security. 
Then to this very me came energy, 
For I had seen nibbana thoroughly. 
‘Tis not for me to follow sense-desires. 
1’11 not turn back. I will become the man 
Who fares on to the God-life as his goal.
According to Mrs. Rhys Davids, the historical Buddha was not born 
Crown Prince of the great King Suddhodana, as legend would have it, 
but was probably the eldest son of an aristocrat who was no more than 
one of the local leaders in a small kingdom in northern India where part 
of the Sakya clan was domiciliated at the time. This political arrangement 
was reinstituted into a communal order by the Buddha after his enlighten­
ment. Rhys Davids surmises that in his youth the Buddha had likely led 
a life of chivalry, characterized by self-control, gallantry, and discipline, 
rather than, as later descriptions would have it, a life of comfort and 
sensuality.5 Text 1 from the Anguttara-Nikaya may be the first to depict 
his youth in these latter terms.
5 T. W. Rhys Davids, Gotama the Man, London, 1928.
We may accordingly leave to one side Text 1 concerning life in the 
three palaces, and turn our attention to Text 2. By relating that passage to 
Text 3, which as we observed forms the conclusion to the following sutta, 
the resultant reflections on old age, sickness, and death can be seen to 
suggest a way to resolve several important problems that arise in this 
regard.
To begin with, the onslaught of old age, sickness, and death is not 
looked upon as the lot of other people. Nor are they ever taken as mere 
physical phenomena. Rather the Buddha grieves over them as the wounds 
of his own heart. In coming to grips with the problems of old age, sickness, 
and death as his very own, the young Buddha became their prisoner even 
as he stood in the full flower of youth, in sound health, and surrounded 
by the delights of life. (In one sutta we read how the Buddha happened 
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one day upon an old beggar and his wife squatting along the roadside 
and warming themselves by a fire fueled with dried dung, whiling away 
their days in idleness. The Buddha turned to his disciples and announced, 
“It is already too late for such as these to walk the true path to religious 
awakening.”) The young Buddha realized that he was in the grip of a 
problem of relating to his being, a problem that revealed itself from out of 
these “limit situations.” He saw that courage is needed to carry on the 
pursuit of the essence or wholeness of being proper to one’s actual human 
condition (Dasein), and that to see that pursuit through to its end one must 
resolve to effect a harsh and uncompromising negation of one’s every­
day self. This is always the case, but it was especially true in India at the 
time. It is a task for which one’s spirit must be sufficiently strong and 
sufficiently supple, to say nothing of one’s will power.
What Heidegger spoke of as “preliminary resolve” (yorlaufende Ent- 
schlossenheit) is, in a wider sense, always valid; but where religious 
awakening is concerned it takes on an additional nuance. For the young 
Buddha, the existential question unlocked the way inward—the way that 
he and his disciples were later to call the way of the holy quest.
The possibility of forfeiting the existential authenticity of one’s being 
and abandoning oneself to corruption (Verfallenheit) is also present here. 
The Buddha is referred to in the translation given here as “troubled.” 
Elsewhere the phrase has been rendered as the Buddha’s having “deviated 
from himself” or “taken leave of himself.” The word attiyati being used 
here implies a being anxious, a sorrowing over something, a tormenting 
of oneself, and so forth. The attitude of the average individual shows up 
on the one hand as a consciousness filled with anxiety over old age, 
sickness, and death, a consciousness that feels itself responsible for these 
things as something that belongs to it; and yet at the same time, on the 
other, hopes if at all possible to shake free of its anxiety and not to have 
to face these things as its own problem. Whichever be the case, though, 
the same relationship obtains: through old age, sickness, and death one’s 
existence is being questioned subconsciously precisely because one does 
not face these things to question them consciously. That is why the sight 
of another’s sickness, for instance, can arouse feelings of anxiety in such 
persons, as if it were they themselves who were the afflicted, and generate 
a sense of trouble, shame, and disgust within them. The Buddha sought 
to overcome this erroneous attitude of the commonplace individual 
toward old age, sickness, and death, and in its place to inspire a sort of
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“preliminary resolve,” constellating the problem of the three sufferings 
as a primordial, existential question so that each individual might assume 
“self-transcending” as a proper task.
Old age, sickness, and death are understood as the existential law 
(dharma, dhamma) before whose inevitability humans cannot but ac­
quiesce. They point to a problem for which I myself, as an individual, 
must take responsibility. From this it becomes evident that this law is 
essentially different from a law of nature. The laws of nature relative 
to sickness tell us of its causes and so forth, and provide us with a knowl­
edge of the means to recovery. A law of this sort falls within the realms 
of the objective-universal and thus remains forever at an abstract level 
where I, as the one who is sick, am but a mere instance. If, however, I am 
able, through the pain of my sickness, to appropriate to myself the truths 
which belong to my irreplaceable self, then the pain of my sickness becomes 
a source of something new: it opens for me the way inward. Sickness 
enlightens me on the essence of the human.
Now law, dhamma, holds true not only for the particular individual but 
for all of humanity in general, albeit in such a way that the dhamma 
touches the particular in each self. This understanding of the self as a 
being-human that is a being-in-the-world is already laden with the ques­
tions: Where do I come from? Where am I going? Primitive Buddhism 
uses the word bhava to express such understanding. We may now turn to 
consider the intimate connection between bhava and old age, sickness, 
and death.
The fact that human beings are liable to the laws of old age, sickness, 
and death cannot but deeply impress one with a sense of the impermanence 
of all things. Impermanence strips naked the one who comprehends the 
essence of the human as a “being-toward-death” and discovers its ground 
and origin to lie in nothingness. Primitive Buddhism shows a penetrating 
sensitivity to impermanence. In the “flower chapter” of the Dhammapada, 
for instance, we come across the following lines:
Death overpowers a man who is gathering flowers, and whose mind
is distracted, before he is satiated in his pleasures.
Death carries off a man who is gathering flowers and whose mind 
is distracted, as a flood carries off a sleeping village.6
6 The Dhammapada, tr. by Irving Babbit, New York, 1936, p. 10 (w. 47, 48).
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In the Dhammapada, as in other canons, impermanence is also likened 
to a burning fire. Fire, which sets ablaze everything that it comes into 
contact with, is a particularly fitting image because it represents the 
essential relationship between impermanence and suffering. Indeed, the 
articulation of the connections between impermanence, suffering, and ego­
lessness make up the fundamental creed of the Buddha.
Later in the Dhammapada we find the verses:
“All existing things are transient.” He who knows and sees this 
ceases to be the thrall of grief.
“All existing things are involved in suffering.” He who knows and 
perceives this ceases to be the thrall of grief.
“All existing things are unreal.”7 He who knows and perceives this
7 That is, without a firm ground or ego.
• Tfie Dhammapada t p. 93 (w. 277-79).
is no longer the thrall of grief.8
That everything is impermanent (transient), then, may be expressed in 
the words, “Everything burns.” Once, after his enlightenment, the Bud­
dha climbed atop a mountain. At that point a fire broke out somewhere 
on the opposite mountain or in the town below it. The Buddha turned 
to his disciples in their commotion and said, “Do you think it is only the 
mountain that is burning? It is not only the mountain that bums, but 
your eyes that see it as well. Everything is burning. As much that which is 
seen as that which sees—all burning together. As much that which is heard 
as that which hears—all burning...”
This instruction easily throws understanding into confusion, for it 
takes epistemological reflection on the relationship between sense organs— 
eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body (touch) and will, the organ of thinking— 
and their objects—colors, sounds, smells, tastes, textures, mind-objects— 
and transposes it into the problem of impermanence.
To the Buddhist way of thinking, what happens in impermanence is that 
each and every thing becomes what it in truth is. In this context, the sense 
of the “impermanence of all earthly things” gives expression to the dis­
position of impermanence that informs the whole of beings and so im- 
mingles with it as to make the sense of impermanence and impermanence 
itself one and the same. To see the sense of impermanence as a form of 
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impermanence suggests seeing the whole of being mirroring itself to itself. 
This sense of impermanence is thus a consciousness of my finiteness, and 
the impermanence of my self is thus able to bring me for the first time to 
an insight into the impermanence of the world as a whole. It would there­
fore be a misunderstanding on my part if I were to take it merely as 
another of those feelings of self-will that I, as a subject, impose onto things, 
and fail to see my sentiment of impermanence as belonging to the authentic 
disposition that informs things themselves. The fact that I feel my own 
impermanence is rather an expression of the impermanence of the entire 
cosmos and the whole of being itself. And thereby that “sense” (Stimmung) 
becomes the fundamental “disposition” (fiestimmung) that originates in 
things from out of their very essence. Only in so understanding the meta­
physical significance of the statement that “Everything bums” do world 
and ego, each in its thusness (tathata), assume a relationship to that 
“burning,” an original relationship grounded in a dimension that lies be­
yond the opposition of subject and object. There can be no understanding 
sub specie aetemitatis without understanding sub specie mortis.
To take up one of the images from the Dhammapada, when the waters 
of a flood overwhelm a village, it is the entire order of the town (the totality 
of relationships that assign each thing its place within the town) that is 
caught up in the whirlpool together with me myself—I and Thou, people 
and houses, roads and bridges, trees and forests. This, too, leads us to 
see that the opposition between subject and object really stems initially 
from a feeling of their oneness in impermanence: one takes this feeling of 
oneness from its base and stands it upright like a partition to divide the 
world between subject and object. In other words, this opposition of 
subject and object arises from a perverted self-consciousness, from 
reflecting the feeling of impermanence in the mirror of reason.
We usually consider purely epistemological reflection on the essence 
of subject and object to suffice. It seems to me, however, that when we 
take a closer look at such reflection we see that it does not represent so much 
the mature fruit of thought as a failure of insight into the web of imperma­
nence that makes up the world as the ground of such reflection. That is, 
it arises from a lack of authentic experience of the ground where subject 
and object are one. In primitive Buddhism’s considerations of the actual 
condition of things (their Dasein), we find a way of representing “the 
objective in general” by referring to it concretely and directly as “form” 
or rupa. It speaks of sensible entities as configurations with shape and 
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color. Buddhist commentators derive the word rfipa from the verb ruppati 
meaning “to be broken,” “to be suffering from fever,” “to be pestered by 
snakes, mosquitoes,or the like.” The notion of rupa as form or configura­
tion thus represents the outcome of a process or event that is circumscribed 
by the verb ruppati. There is deep insight to be found here in primitive 
Buddhism, even though there be modem scholars who resist such an ety­
mological derivation.
Everything flows. For the subject that clings obstinately to something, 
not wishing to let go of it, the “form” of that thing—that is, that with 
which the subject wills to engage itself—becomes a hindrance and an 
affliction.
From just such a nexus of involvement the configuration of a thing 
arises, in a perverted sort of way, as something objective which is rightly 
rendered by the word rupa. For the epistemological opposition of subject 
and object is simply a projection from the dimension of willing. Seen in 
this light, the symbolic expression, “Everything bums,” requires that we 
take a closer look at the opposition of subject and object as it arises from 
a willful obstinacy, from a “thirsting.”
“Burning” points both to the fact of impermanence and to the fact of 
thirst. In burning and thirsting I pursue the object of my desire and make 
it bum: I consume it for the satisfaction of my thirst. Meantime, the ob­
ject of my desire works an allurement of its own, enkindling my desire. This 
is what the notion of “burning” implies.
With the idea, “Everything burns,” therefore, two aspects of the world 
are brought together in a most significant and intelligible way, that of 
impermanence and that of thirsting.
In the passages from the Dhammapada cited earlier, death is understood 
as the destiny that befalls one suddenly from without. In the reflections 
of the Buddha on old age, sickness, and death in the Atiguttara-Nikaya 
referred to, however, these three sorrows are understood as the funda­
mental fact of human finiteness. They are seen at the same time as a 
task—one must be prepared to walk the way of overcoming the three sor­
rows—though in fact humans ever and again turn aside from this task as 
from no other.
One prefers to leave one’s original essence in the dark and to ascribe 
all responsibility for the tragedies of the present to others. Yet even if one 
be now rich and young, healthy and full of the pride of life, sooner or later 
there will be no escaping the responsibility that comes from being liable 
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to the laws of old age, sickness, and death that apply to all humans.
Death has us in its grip, even in the midst of youth, health, and fullness 
of life. At any moment death can grab ahold of us and take us on a trip, 
even during the repose of a life of enjoyment. And that is not all. The 
laws of old age, sickness, and death form the essential ground of my actual 
condition. Their three sorrows are my very Dasein itself. That I recognize 
this fact only in others and fail to see it as true for myself as well, like a rich 
man looking down at a poor beggar, is the result of being under the illu­
sion that I am somehow uniquely privileged. But in such matters there is 
no privilege.
The trouble, shame, and disgust that I feel when I see another advanced 
in years, sick, or dead points me the way to the ground that 1 am to reach. 
Although the way that leads to my ground also leads to my downfall, still 
it should be faced squarely and trod to the end (one may liken it to Hegel’s 
“going to the ground”), for it is at the same time the leap to true, authentic 
existence, a surmounting or overturning of negation into affirmation.
One who is not up to this task will for that reason stand arrogantly in 
front of others, even though their aging, their sickness, or their death are 
just as much his own affair. As a robber, anxious for his own safety, ends 
up murdering the one he would rob, so does it happen that a commonplace 
fellow faced, let us say, with the appearance of a sick fellow, comes to feel 
uncertain of his own state of being and is cast into anxiety.
For the Buddha, the word mada connotes an “arrogance” that combines 
the senses of pride and inebriation. It expresses a situation in which one is 
transported out of oneself, drunk with the vitality of youth. The primitive 
Buddhist analysis of arrogance runs somewhat along the lines of the 
treatment of Angst found in the existential philosophy of Heidegger and 
the analysis of despair found in Kierkegaard. Dealing with anxiety in the 
face of death, Heidegger reckons the flight from anxiety to be itself a sign 
of anxiety, and Kierkegaard similarly analyzes the relationship between 
despair and arrogance in considering the state of not-being-in-despair as 
itself a form of despair. It is, however, to be noted in this regard that in 
the Buddha’s analysis of arrogance, the problem of the awakening of the 
inauthentic individual to authentic self-awareness is immediately carried 
over into the relationship between I and Thou (“they,” “others”). In 
existential philosophy, the commonplace fellow who is not aware even of 
the problem of his own death is taken to be buried alive in mediocrity 
where empty chatter and the mask worn before the world are all impor­
20
THE MEANING OF OTHER POWER
tant; but the relation between one’s own anxiety and “others” is not 
included in the concrete form of arrogance.
Quite to the contrary, in Kierkegaard the Thou is seen exclusively as 
the absolute, the “Wholly Other” who is God. This means that interhuman 
relationships must relate to the relationship to God as periphery to center. 
What is more, our despair is seen as a confrontation with or estrangement 
from God and hence, consciously or not, presupposes that relationship 
at its ground.
For the Buddha, the distinctive feature of ego-dominated conscious­
ness consists in that anxiety before the laws of old age, sickness, and 
death is able to bring us to the decision that precedes religious existence; 
and that the flight from this anxiety, as a concrete anxiety before the world, 
is able to include from the outset the I-Thou relationship, even if only in 
veiled or perverted form.
The Departure of the Buddha from the Four Castle Gates
As the young Buddha reflected on how unsuitable a response arrogance 
was, and as he set out on the way that was to carry him beyond the in­
authentic self that is liable to the laws of old age, sickness, and death, 
perversion with all its manifestations was wiped away. The exposition 
of the previous pages places the first conversion of the Buddha at this 
point, for it was precisely here that the religious question first came to 
light in him, though not in such a way that the final state of salvation was 
to be reached all at once. As we shall see, the continually new forms that 
his religious quest assumed show us a process of deepening. The goal of 
authentic Buddhahood lay still far ahead.
As Oldenberg has rightly pointed out, the Mahapaddna Suttanta in the 
Digha-Nikdya9 is a further development of the legend of the three palaces 
found in the Ahguttara-Nikaya and treated in the foregoing section. There 
we read, too, that the young Buddha—who is called now Vipassi10— 
spent his days full of pleasures in the three palaces. The miracle stories 
of his childhood are given somewhat fuller treatment in this sutta, and 
9 Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II, trans, by T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, 
London, Pali Text Society, pp. 4-41.
10 Vipassi is the name of the first of seven former Buddhas.
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the details of his life of luxury are also more amply described.11
11 One may suppose that the ideal type after which the legend of the young Buddha 
as savior was fashioned was already considerably developed at the time of the com­
position of this sutta. The time of composition itself is difficult to determine, but I 
would place it between 50 and 100 years after the death of the Buddha.
11 Dialogues of the Buddha, I, p. 19 (v. 22).
Then one day, on his way through the country, the Buddha met an old 
man. Never having seen an old and feeble person before, he was taken 
aback at the sight. In the course of his ensuing conversation with a 
wagoner, the Buddha gains the insight that he, too, is liable to the law 
of old age and cannot escape it. He is sorely afflicted and laments: “Shame 
then verily be upon this thing called birth [jntz], since to one bom old age 
shows itself like that!”12
The same reflection is repeated in the next scene in which he encounters 
a sick person, and again a third time when he runs across the body of one 
who has died. Last of all, he meets a monk and is deeply moved by his 
peace of mind and life of chastity. After speaking with the monk, Vipassi 
finally comes to the decision to undertake himself the life of a monk.
These four events are known as the “departure of the Buddha from the 
four castle gates” since, according to later accounts of his life, he sallied 
forth on each occasion from a different one of the four portals of his resi­
dence—the eastern, the western, the southern, and lastly the northern. 
This resolve of the Buddha to become a monk, together with his subse­
quent “withdrawal from the world,” is the part of his story that has been 
accorded the greatest affection and attention in later narrations, poetry, 
and artistic representations.
Given their profound content and symbolic religious power, the encoun­
ters of the Buddha with old age, sickness, and death, and his religious 
decision to renounce the world—especially in their dramatic representa­
tions—made a deep impression on the common people and were decisive 
in promoting the transmission of Buddhism to later generations.
For example, the biographies of famous people from the Japanese 
middle ages often show the direct influence of these dramatized narrations 
of the Buddha’s life on the resolve of these individuals to cut themselves 
off from family and home. Young men at the time who wished to strike 
out on a religious path, were consciously or unconsciously imitating the 
way of the Buddha, as we see for example in the case of Saigyd (1118— 
1190), Shinran (1173-1262), and Dogen (1200-1253). This pattern is also 
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reflected throughout the Buddhist lands of southeast Asia in certain 
initiation rites for entrance into a temple: a young man introduced to the 
community of monks is looked on as a “Crown Prince Siddhartha” come 
forth from the castle gates.
One of the distinctive characteristics of this biographical account of 
the Buddha is, as we shall mention later, that it shows in very concrete 
form the process through which the religious question deepened in the 
experience of the Buddha himself. This is what lends the story its impres­
siveness.
In the hearts of simple Christian folk the figure of St. Francis of Assisi 
sunk deep roots in like fashion. For many, hearing the life of this saint 
meant the first time that the problems of old age, sickness, and death 
became real to them and permeated their whole being. In his life as well 
we see all the stages through which the Buddha had passed: how pride in 
the flower of his youth did battle with a deepening religiosity, and how 
the entire course of his life led him gradually to forsake his paternal home 
and withdraw from the world. Up to our own day the image of the saint 
from Assisi has left its indelible mark on Christian religiosity.
It is now thought that St. Francis may have read a modified version 
of the legend of the Buddha in the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat,13 
which had been composed in Greek in the eighth century and transmitted 
westwards to Europe in the Middle Ages. From there, the formulation of 
the religious question and the renunciation of the world as a solution to 
that question, as we find them in St. Francis, influenced a great number 
of believers after his death.
13 See H. Th ode, Franz von Assisi und die Anfdnge der Kunst der Renaissance in 
Italien, Vienna, 1934. Regarding the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat (Joasaph), see 
H. Dumoulin, Begegnung mit dem Buddhismus: Fine Einfuhrung, Freiburg, 1978, pp. 
29-30; J. Jacobs, Barlaam and Josaphat: English Lives of the Buddha, London, 1896.
** A. Foucher, La vie du Boudda d'apris les textes et les monuments de I'lnde, Paris, 
1949.
Scholars such as Foucher14 argue that if one takes into consideration 
the conditions under which his conversion occurred, the biography of 
Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, is almost closer to the life of 
the Buddha than it is to that of St. Francis. In many religious conversions, 
the deeds of great religious personalities are being imitated, often uncon­
sciously. There are also typical and well known instances of this phe­
nomenon with regard to a strengthening of religiosity. It should be noted 
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further here that the departure of the Buddha from the four gates, which 
has become something of an archetype of this process, is operative not only 
in Buddhist lands but also in the West, though not with the same impact 
that it has in the East.
The origin of the belief in former Buddhas belongs, of course, to the 
time after Gotama Buddha. According to the Dharmic Inscriptions of 
King A§oka, the king himself had made a personal pilgrimage to the tomb 
(stupa) of the Buddha of a former age (Konigama Buddha). Other ancient 
texts15 present the fundamental principles of morality as the basic teach­
ing of the “many [former] Buddhas.**  One sutta in the Sathyutta-Nikaya'6 
describing “dependent origination” remarks in an important passage 
that this doctrine of the Buddha is the rediscovery of an ancient teaching, 
and that dependent origination belongs to a way of the Four Holy Truths 
and the Holy Eightfold Path already trod by ancient sages (Buddhas). 
From this one might conclude, as Schayer does,17 *that there existed ancient 
transmissions, since lost, which had been linked to four, seven, or ten for­
mer Buddhas.
15 The Dhammapada, w. 184ff.
16 The Book of the Kindred Sayings, Part II, trans, by F. H. Woodward, London, 
Pali Text Society, 1982, XII, pp. Iff.
17 S. Schayer, Vorarbeitan zur Geschichte der mayahanistischen Erldsungslehren, 
Munich, 1921; “Pre-canonical Buddhism,** Arvhic Orientalni, 7, 1935, pp. 122-32, 
especially pp. 124-25; “New Contributions to the Problem of Pre-hinayanistic Bud­
dhism, The Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies, 1, 1937, pp. 8-9.
»• See note 9.
Further worthy of note is the fact that immediately after the account 
of the departure of the Buddha from the four gates in the Mahapadana 
Suttanta, we find an explanation of the doctrine of dependent origina­
tion.1 H The three original questions of the Buddha reproduced in the 
Ahguttara-Nikaya (Text 2 above) were thus developed in the Mahapadana 
Suttanta into the legend of the four departures. But the further passage 
in the Mahapadana Suttanta on the doctrine of dependent origination 
provides the real and proper answer to these questions. And the resolute 
spiritual conversion based on this answer constitutes the content of the 
Buddha's enlightenment.
As noted above, the Mahapadana Suttanta takes the most striking events 
in the biography of the Buddha and simply sets them up as norms (dham- 
matd) for Buddha-existence, projecting them then onto former Buddhas 
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(Vipassi et al.). This helps to explain why the Mahapadana Suttanta omits 
the description of the entire long course of the quest for the way of the 
holy, and why the departure of the Buddha from the four gates is followed 
immediately by the doctrine of dependent origination.
Also connected with the Mahapadana Suttanta is the Ariyapariyesana 
Sutta in the Majjhima-Nikaya. In its first part, this sutta explains the 
difference between the holy (ariyan) and the unholy (unariyan) quest. 
Of this latter, the Buddha remarks: “As to this, monks, someone, liable 
to birth, because of self, seeks what is likewise liable to birth....” The 
same is then repeated of old age, sickness, and death. It is easy to see that 
this is nothing other than a new development of the problem treated in 
the foregoing section which had led the young Buddha to his first reflec­
tions. There it was presented in terms of arrogance before others subject 
to the selfsame laws of old age, sickness, and death; here it is presented as 
the “quest for something” subject to the same fate as the one who is quest­
ing. The passage that follows, however, provides a new twist to the 
problem:
And what, monks, would you say is liable to birth? Sons and wife, 
monks, are liable to birth, women-slaves and men-slaves are liable 
to birth, goats and sheep,... cocks and swine,... gold and silver.... 
These attachments, monks, are liable to birth; yet this (man), en­
slaved, infatuated, addicted, being liable to birth because of self, 
seeks what is also liable to birth.
And what, monks, would you say is liable to aging? Sons and 
wife, monks, are liable to aging... .19
19 The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (JMajjhima-NikdyaY Vol. 1, trans, 
by I. B. Homer, London, Pali Text Society, 1967, p. 205.
Once again the point is repeated that all are subject to sickness and death 
as well. This passage revolves about the notion of the foundations of the 
human condition (upddhi\ pl., upadhago) encountered earlier in Text 3. 
Upadhi is what we long for in the things enumerated there, what we think 
worth possessing. Like the boy that sticks his hand into the jar of sweets 
and cannot pull it out again once he has taken ahold of what he was after, 
so our grasping after things provokes a counter-reaction from the side of 
the things themselves. Behind the lure lurks the snare. When we imagine 
an object as object, our attitude is already unconsciously one of grasping. 
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This is particularly noticeable when our grasping gets solidified, that is 
when it becomes, objectively speaking, possession and property, and sub­
jectively speaking, habit and inclination. Just as memory consists in the 
following of time-worn tracks (milinda panha), so too does the inclination 
to evil consist in the same evil deeds being repeated persistently in com­
plicity with the objects that lead me astray. The fateful collaboration of 
the inclination to evil with the enslaving character of things shows withal 
the same structure as the correlation between our sense of and disposition 
to “being toward death” on the one hand, and the transiency of things on 
the other. This explains why the inclination to evil, when truly realized 
through existential self-consciousness, not only continually pronounces 
an indictment against particular individuals for their sinfulness but against 
all of humanity and the world as a whole.
The connection between this first part of the Ariyapariyesana Sutta 
and the sutta cited earlier in Text 2 receives its literal confirmation in the 
following terms:
And I too, monks, before awakening, while I was still the bodhisatta, 
not fully awakened, being liable to birth because of self, sought 
what was likewise liable to aging.... Then it occurred to me, 
monks, “Why do I, liable to birth because of self, seek what is like­
wise liable to birth;... being liable to stain [and death] because of 
self, seek what is likewise liable to stain [and death]? Suppose that 
I (although) being liable to birth because of self, having known the 
peril in what is likewise liable to birth, should seek the unborn, the 
uttermost security from the bonds—nibbanal,.. .”20
20 The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings, p. 207.
21 See notes 9 and 19.
The intimate connection between the two suttas may help us to ap­
preciate the similar parallel to be seen between the doctrine of dependent 
origination in the Mahapadana Suttanta and the doctrine of the quest for 
the holy in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta,21 Whereas at first sight the two 
are different, in fact both treat the same quest for the holy, only from 
different aspects. It is here that mention needs be made of the problem of 
dependent origination and the closely related question of the Four Holy 
Truths. The way of the quest for the holy I should like to call the transcen­
dental way, since it leads us to the absolute (nirvapa) through a self-tran­
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scending. In contrast, the doctrine of dependent origination leads us to 
a fundamental unknowing, and only by breaking through this fundamental 
unknowing are we able to realize the absolute in ourselves. Since the 
quest for the holy leads directly to the ideal in ascending stages, it must 
needs be supported by a transdescendental way as its counterpart. As 
Kant arrived at the notion of “radical evil” and our “inclination to evil” 
in the final phase of his reflections on the transcendental way, and as 
Schelling and Hegel developed this problem of Kant further, transcenden­
tal idealism and transdescendental existentialism belong together as two 
aspects of one and the same way. The former was undertaken by German 
idealism; the latter has, alas, yet to be adequately developed in Western 
thought. In this regard, the tradition of Buddhism, and in particular the 
Yogacara School, has achieved noteworthy results.
I believe that a dialogue and synthesis of these two spiritual standpoints 
is both possible and desirable. At the end of the transcendental-trans- 
descendental way, the true way of communication between the Buddha 
and his disciples springs open before us. Therein lies the core of the spirit of 
primitive Buddhism, with the Holy Eightfold Path representing the summit 
of it <r> religious self-consciousness. How do jiriki and tariki relate to one 
another at this summit? What happens to the master-disciple relationship 
there? Primitive Buddhism presents us with the key to the answer.
Translated by James W. Heisig
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